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Abstract
Carl Craver’s mutual manipulability criterion aims to pick out all and only
those components of a mechanism that are constitutively relevant with re-
spect to a given phenomenon. In devising his criterion, Craver has made
heavy use of the notion of an ideal intervention, which is a tool for illuminat-
ing causal concepts in causal models. The problem is that typical mechanistic
models contain non-causal relations in addition to causal ones, which is why
the standard concept of an ideal intervention is not appropriate in that con-
text. In this paper, I first show how top-down interventions in mechanistic
models violate the conditions for ideal interventions. Drawing from recent
developments in the causal exclusion literature, I then argue for extended in-
terventionism better suited for the purposes of the new mechanist. Finally, I
show why adopting such an extended account leads to the surprising conse-
quence that an important subset of mechanistic interlevel relations come out
as causal.
Keywords: mutual manipulability, mechanisms, supervenience, realization, inter-
ventionism, causal inbetweenness
1 Introduction
The notion of an ideal intervention has been developed in the causality literature in
an attempt to make sense of certain basic causal concepts in the context of mod-
els containing counterfactual dependency relations between variables (Woodward
2005). Carl Craver (2007) has adopted the concept in characterizing his criterion
of mutual manipulability, which aims to pick out all and only those components of
a mechanism that are constitutively relevant for its behaviour. Mechanistic mod-
els, however, contain causal as well as non-causal relations, which is a problem for
Craver’s account of mutual manipulability. It is a problem because the presence of
non-causal relations in mechanistic models renders ideal interventions, which Craver
uses to define his concept of mutual manipulability, not possible or not likely in the
mechanistic context. In this paper, I first pose the above problem to Craver and
then propose to solve it by adopting an extended account of ideal interventions and
by arguing that mutual manipulability relations are best understood as involving not
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two but three variables. After proposing my solution, I investigate what the conse-
quences of its adoption are in the mechanistic context. One of those consequences
turns out to be that an important subset of the interlevel relations in mechanis-
tic models comes out as causal. Thus, the debate on the metaphysics of mutual
manipulability will be advanced in three ways: (1) by discovering a new problem
for Craver’s account of mutual manipulability; (2) by solving that problem via (i)
arguing for an account of ideal interventions suitable in the mechanistic context and
(ii) unpacking mutual manipulability as a three-variable affair; and (3) by analyzing
the implications of the proposed solution. The resulting picture of the metaphysics
of mechanisms I call ‘causal inbetweenness’. Why the name of my theory involves
not only ‘causal’ but also ‘inbetweenness’ will become clear in the final section of
the paper.
2 Mutual Manipulability and the Problem of Con-
stitutive Relevance
It is now well established that we explain many things mechanistically (Bechtel and
Richardson 1993, Machamer et al 2000, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Craver
2007). We are not content to merely determine the regularities but we also want
to know why those regularities hold (Cummins 2000). In psychology, neuroscience
and elsewhere, a satisfactory explanation for the existence of some regularity is
often a description of an underlying mechanism. Such descriptions specify how a
mechanism exhibiting a behaviour comes to do so as the result of the behaviours
of its components. This type of explanation is appropriately called constitutive,
because is involves explaining the behaviour of a whole in terms of the behaviours
of its parts.
That is the descriptive story, in very brief detail, but what about the prescriptive
one? A good account of scientific explanation not only provides a faithful picture
of the practice of science, but also gives some grounds for distinguishing good
explanations from bad ones. In the mechanistic context, a plausible ideal for a good
explanation is this: an explanation should describe all and only those components
that are relevant with respect to the explanandum phenomenon. To get an idea
of what this means, suppose I want to explain why my bicycle slows down when I
squeeze the lever mounted to its handlebar; but in addition to cables, brake pads
and rims, I also describe bartapes, bottle cages and dustcaps. The last three things
are parts of my bike all right, but they aren’t relevant parts with respect to the
phenomenon to be explained, at least in the majority of circumstances. Similarly,
my explanation can go wrong if it includes too little detail. For example, if I fail
to mention calipers, bolts or cable guides, I have not yet provided a full account
of the braking mechanism. A theory of mechanistic explanation should be able to
determine the components that count as relevant and to specify the nature of the
relation that holds between those components and the explanandum.
Carl Craver (2007) has recognized the importance of distinguishing genuine
components from mere parts, and he has worked out an account of the norms
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of mechanistic explanation. His mutual manipulability criterion aims to pick out
precisely those components that are ‘constitutively relevant’ in a mechanism with
respect to a given phenomenon. An ideal mechanistic explanation of a phenomenon
would then consist of a description of the organized behaviours of those constitu-
tively relevant components. If successful, the mutual manipulability criterion would
help to decide whether a putative mechanistic explanation describes the correct enti-
ties (constitutively relevant components) and to elucidate the nature of the relation
between those entities and the explanandum (a relation of mutual manipulability).
It would therefore be a great step forward in the process of developing a prescriptive
account of mechanistic explanation.
In order to see how mutual manipulability works, let us introduce some notation.
First, we have a mechanism S that ‘engages in activity’ ψ where S’s ψ-ing is
understood as a complex input-output relationship. The inputs here include all of
the conditions that are required for S to ψ. S has a set of components {X1, X2,
..., Xn} that also engage in activities, φi. (Xi’s φi-ing can also be understood as
a complex input-output relationship, given that the mechanistic decomposition is
often thought to continue a couple of levels ‘downwards’ until it ‘bottoms out’ at
some pragmatically determined level. Here, Xi’s φi-ing can be intuitively thought
to be at a lower mechanistic level than S itself because Xi is a component in S’s
ψ-ing.)
According to Craver, the norms of constitutive relevance are in fact implicit in the
experimental practice in neuroscience and elsewhere. There are two basic kinds of
experiment: bottom-up and top-down. Bottom-up experiments include interference
and stimulation experiments. In what Craver calls interference experiments, one
prevents some suspected component X’s φ -ing, in some suspected mechanism S,
and observes the resulting changes in S’s ψ-ing. In what Craver calls stimulation
experiments, one excites X’s φ -ing and again observes the changes in S’s ψ-ing.
The point in both kinds of experiment is to see whether one is able to manipulate
S’s ψ-ing by manipulating the φ -ing of some of its putative components. Finally,
in what Craver calls activation experiments, one varies the conditions for S’s ψ-
ing and observes whether changes in S’s ψ-ing are accompanied with changes in
some putative component X’s φ -ing. In this top-down intervention the point is to
see whether one is able to manipulate X’s φ -ing by manipulating S’s ψ-ing. Note
that the similarity between the expressions ‘stimulation experiment’ and ‘activation
experiment’ is potentially misleading: the two are sharply distinct because the former
is a bottom-up experiment while the latter is a top-down experiment.
The idea, then, is that component X’s φ -ing is constitutively relevant for mech-
anism S’s ψ-ing when the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) X is part of S; (ii) in the conditions relevant to the request for
explanation there is some change to X’s φ -ing that changes S’s ψ-ing;
and (iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there
is some change to S’s ψ-ing that changes X’s φ -ing (Craver 2007, p.
153).
Why is it required that the relationship be bidirectional? The argument is that
neither top-down nor bottom-up experiments alone suffice to determine whether
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X’s φ -ing is relevant for S’s ψ-ing. Suppose I want to know whether the mudguards
in my bicycle are constitutive parts of its braking mechanism. As it happens, a simple
intervention on the mudguards (loosening their fixings) changes the behaviour of
the braking mechanism as a whole, by blocking the movement of the brake calipers
and preventing the brake pads from reaching the rims. A change in a putative
component, therefore, changes S’s ψ-ing. Yet it would be hasty to conclude, on the
grounds of this bottom-up intervention, that the mudguards are constitutive parts of
the braking mechanism. For note that under normal circumstances it is not possible
to loosen the fixings of the mudguards by squeezing the brake levers. A change
in S’s ψ-ing, in other words, doesn’t result in a change in the component under
investigation. This means that the manipulability relation between the mudguard
and the braking mechanism is unidirectional and not bidirectional as required by
Craver’s conditions for constitutive relevance; the top-down intervention rules out
the mudguards as constitutively relevant for the braking mechanism.1
Similarly, suppose I intervene on the braking mechanism as a whole, by squeez-
ing the brake levers, in order to figure out whether my speedometer is one of its
constitutive parts. This top-down intervention is not enough because there is a
change in my speedometer (its reading) that systematically co-varies with changes
in the braking mechanism as a whole. Thus, a change in S’s ψ-ing does result in a
change in the putative X’s φ -ing. Yet it is easy to rule out the speedometer as a part
of the braking system by attempting to manipulate the behaviour of the braking
mechanism as a whole by manipulating the behaviour of the speedometer. Even if
I shut down the speedometer, the bike is still going fast (and the police won’t have
any of my excuses). This time it is the bottom-up intervention that rules out the
putative component as constitutively relevant. Since mutual manipulability requires
that X’s φ -ing passes both top-down and bottom-up tests, it delivers the correct
result with problem cases such as these.
Finally, it is very easy to see why intuitively genuine components, such as the
cables in a typical bicycle brake mechanism, successfully pass the mutual manipula-
bility test. Squeezing the brake levers moves the cables in their housings; preventing
the cables from moving makes the whole system unresponsive. So far so good.
3 The Ideality of Interventions
One of the innovations in Craver (2007) is the use of the manipulationist approach
to causality to make sense of the relations holding between entities in mechanistic
models. A central notion the manipulationist literature is that of an ideal interven-
tion, which can be utilized to define various causal concepts (Woodward 2005). It
turns out to be an important notion for Craver’s purposes as well, for the changes
in X’s φ -ing and S’s ψ-ing in conditions (ii) and (iii) for mutual manipulability are
supposed to occur as follows: ‘There should be some ideal intervention on φ under
which ψ changes, and there should be some ideal intervention on ψ under which
1As an anonymous reviewer points out, there is bound to be some interest-relativity as to how
detailed one’s mechanistic story of a phenomenon should be. The situation is analogous to causal
modeling, where the appropriate grain of one’s variables depends on the explanatory task at hand.
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φ changes’(Craver 2007, p. 154, my emphasis). Focusing on the first case, Craver
explicates how such ideal interventions are to be understood:
(I1) the intervention I does not change ψ directly;
(I2) I does not change the value of some other variable φ* that changes
the value of ψ except via the change introduced into φ ;
(I3) I is not correlated with some other variable M that is causally
independent of I and also a cause of ψ; and
(I4) I fixes the value of φ in such a way as to screen off the contribution
of φ ’s other causes to the value of φ(Craver 2007, p. 154).
Why is it important that interventions satisfy the above conditions? In the causal
literature, the answer is very simple. If one’s interventions are ham-fisted, it will not
be possible to isolate the variables2 that are doing the causal work. Suppose my
intervention on φ1 always changes the value of φ2, and that φ2 is causally related to
ψ via some path that is different to the one via which φ1 is causally related to ψ.
Then it won’t be possible for me to decide whether it is φ1 or φ2 that is doing the
causal work with respect to ψ. The only way for me to do it would be to hold one
of the variables fixed while wiggling the other. It is this same consideration that
motivates the inclusion of the ideality conditions in the characterization of mutual
manipulability. If one’s intervention always changes the behaviours of several entities
at a time in a way that conflicts with ideality, then it won’t be possible for one to
isolate the specific entity, or entities, that changed the behaviour of the mechanism
as a whole.
Here I have been talking about ideal interventions on the component entities
with respect to the behaviour of a mechanism as a whole. What about the opposite
direction? As we recall, the interventions on the behaviour of a mechanism as a
whole with respect to any of its components should also satisfy the conditions of
ideality. But note two things. First, mechanistic models include multiple levels: the
behaviour of a mechanism as a whole is thought to be at a higher level than the
behaviour of its components. Second, the relationship between mechanistic levels
is thought to be non-causal, and it is reasonable to require that the nature of this
relationship is that of metaphysical supervenience or realization. As we will see in
the next section, these two observations land us into trouble.
4 The Interlevel Relations in Mechanistic Models
Figure 1 is a typical representation of a mechanistic model. The behaviour of the
mechanism as a whole is at a higher level and the behaviours of its components
2Throughout this paper I will engage in variable-talk. Variables are very flexible in that they
can be thought to correspond to all kinds of things. For example, if one wishes, it is possible
to think of variables as corresponding to events, with the following two values: {occurs, doesn’t
occur} For many, this would be the appropriate interpretation for the purposes of causal analysis.
However, the values of variables needn’t correspond to events, or be binary, which is welcome given
that there are many situations in which it is useful to have e.g. many-valued variables. Later I
will also talk as if the values of variables would engage in supervenience or realization relations, in
which case the variables are best interpreted as corresponding to properties.
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Figure 1: A typical representation of a mechanistic model, where S’s ψ-ing is at the
higher level and X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing is at the lower level. The relations within levels
are causal; the relation between S’s ψ-ing and X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing is non-causal.
are at a lower level. The relations within the levels, represented by the arrows, are
causal. But the relations between the levels are generally thought to be non-causal
(Craver and Bechtel 2007, Craver 2007, p. 153-154). It will be useful to divide the
latter case, i.e. the inter level relations, into two types. First, we have the relation
between a mechanism and its individual components, which is the type of relation
picked out by the mutual manipulability criterion, and is not represented in Figure
1 (but will be represented in Figure 3). I will return to this relation in Section 6
where I argue, against Craver and others, that it is causal. Second, we have the
relation between the mechanism and its components-taken-together, which is the
type of relation on which I will focus in this section, and to which I refer when I talk
about ‘X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing’. This is the relationship that is represented by the dotted
lines in Figure 1 and with respect to which I agree with Craver and others that it is
non-causal.
Is S’s ψ-ing something over and above of the organized φ -ings of all of the Xs
passing the mutual manipulability test, that is, X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing? Most philoso-
phers and scientist would probably agree that there is some sense in which S’s ψ-ing
is indeed more than just the sum of the φ -ings of its Xs, but that the relation be-
tween the two should not be that of spooky, materialistically inexplicable emergence.
At the same time, many would not want to identify S’s ψ-ing with X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-
ing, and so there is a market for an intermediate type of interlevel relation. Below
I will mostly consider the consequences of requiring that S’s ψ-ing metaphysically
supervenes on X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing. I will also briefly discuss an approach in which
the relation between the two is understood in terms of realization. These are two
common ways of providing non-spooky metaphysics for mechanistic models. My
argument is that both spell trouble for the possibility of ideal interventions.
Supervenience may appear like a promising articulation of an ontologically non-
spooky interlevel relation. In its broad-brush formulation, supervenience is the claim
that, if a set of properties A supervenes on a set of properties B, then there cannot be
any difference in the properties in A without some difference in the properties in B.
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Applied to mechanisms, the claim is that all changes in S’s ψ-ing (the supervenient
set) must be accompanied with some changes in X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing (the subvenient
set). The subvenient set is formed by what I’ve called components-taken-together
because changes in a mechanism as a whole generally do not metaphysically neces-
sitate changes in a particular component of that mechanism. There are various ways
to make the supervenience claim more specific, depending, among other things, on
one’s preferences regarding the relation’s modal force and the conditions imposed
on the relevant property sets (Bennett and McLaughlin 2005).3 But rather than
dwelling on the interesting and energy-consuming differences between the various
definitions of supervenience, it suffices for my purposes to focus on the very basic
idea.4
As we recall, X’s φ -ing stands in the relation of mutual manipulability with S’s
ψ-ing just in the case there is an ideal intervention on X’s φ -ing (with respect to S’s
ψ-ing) that results in a change in S’s ψ-ing; and there is an ideal intervention on S’s
ψ-ing (with respect to X’s φ -ing) that results in a change in X’s φ -ing. The problem
is that the presence of supervenience in mechanistic models threatens to render the
latter kinds of intervention non-ideal. If S’s ψ-ing supervenes on X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing,
a change in S’s ψ-ing is necessarily accompanied by a change in X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing,
and the resulting change in X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing is plausibly one that conflicts with
conditions (I1) or (I2) on ideal interventions. The reason is that the target variable
is likely to be among those variables that change in the intervention directly due to
the presence of supervenience, or is likely to be causally related with some variables
that do. Condition (I1) is violated if the target variable is in the supervenience
base for S’s ψ-ing; condition (I2) is violated if the target variable is causally related
with the variables in the supervenience base for S’s ψ-ing. To see why one of these
is likely to be the case, suppose that interventions on S’s ψ-ing regularly change
some X’s φ -ing, but that the φ -ing in question does not change directly in the
intervention as the result of being in the supervenience base for ψ-ing, and is not
causally related with any such directly changing variables. In that case, there would
appear to be a primitive covariance relation between S’s ψ-ing and that X’s φ -ing;
I contend that the model would be regarded as incomplete.5
3In the mechanistic context, Soom (2012) has argued that the relation between S’s ψ-ing and
X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing should be understood in terms of ‘strong supervenience’, while Harbecke (2013)
has put forward a mechanistic modification of what is known as ‘coordinated multiple-domain
supervenience’. Both types of supervenience were originally articulated by Kim (cf. 1984, 1988).
4Note that the overall behaviour of a mechanism is usually characterized in extrinsic terms,
as a kind of input-output regularity. The advocates of mechanistic supervenience, then, argue for
a very similar view as those who hold that dispositions supervene on their ‘bases’. This is worth
mentioning because the supervenience thesis about dispositions has been challenged (cf. Mumford
1994, McKitrick 2003).
5Here I am following Woodward (2014, p. 29-31) in making the ontologically and empirically
plausible assumption that an intervention on a supervening variable ψ is a direct and simultaneous
intervention on its supervenience base SB(ψ): there is just one intervention that is changing
both. For those who do not wish to grant this assumption, it is worth noting that the relationship
between ψ and SB(ψ) also violates the interventionist requirement that one should be able to vary
the value of each variable in one’s model via an intervention while holding the values of any of the
other variables in the model fixed at any of the values within their normal range via independent
interventions (Hausman and Woodward 1999; Woodward 2014, , see also footnotes 9 and 10). If
needed, my conclusion about the lack of ideal interventions on ψ w.r.t SB(ψ) could be reached
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Before moving on, let me briefly address one issue. Some philosophers have ar-
gued for realization-based accounts of mechanistic interlevel relations (Polger 2010,
Gillett 2013; see also Craver 2007, p. 212). The idea in such accounts is that
X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing together realize S’s ψ-ing, where the precise definition of the
realization relation varies from author to author. Consider Gillett’s (cf. 2013) ‘di-
mensioned’ account of realization, which is expressly tailored for the purposes of
constitutive explanation. The standard example of that type of realization is the
relationship between a diamond’s hardness and the bonding and alignment relations
of its constituent carbon atoms. The bonding and alignment relations of those
atoms ‘together non-causally result in’ the hardness of the diamond, just as the
φ -ings of Xs might be thought to ‘together non-causally result in’ the ψ-ing of S.
To see why this doesn’t help with the problem raised above, just consider what
happens if I want to ‘intervene’ on the hardness of a diamond whilst holding fixed
the bonding and alignment relations of the carbon atoms with which it overlaps:
this doesn’t work. More generally, it is not implausible to require that changing a
realized property ψ in an individual always changes some properties φi of the ψ-
realizing constituents of that individual. This is, of course, very similar to the basic
idea driving formulations of supervenience6. It also results in exactly the same kind
of trouble for the possibility of ideal top-down interventions.
5 Interlevel Interventionism
The ideality of top-down interventions seems to be compromised under two famil-
iar accounts of the metaphysics of mechanistic models. Of course there may be
many more concepts in addition to supervenience and realization that we could
use to make sense of the relation between a mechanism and its components-taken-
together, and it is not my aim here to provide an exhaustive analysis of such pos-
sibilities. Nevertheless, I will make the following conjecture: given that we would
want the mechanistic interlevel relation to be one in which the overall behaviour of
a mechanism and the organized behaviours of its components are metaphysically
close-knit in the sense of ruling out spooky emergence and the like, the prospects
are dim for ideal top-down interventions. The reason is that the relevant higher-level
changes are associated with lower-level changes in a way that conflicts with the re-
quirements of ideality. This association is due to the metaphysical close-knittedness
trough that route too. In what follows, I will continue to assume that an intervention on ψ is also
an intervention on SB(ψ). I thank anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this issue.
6Indeed, as David Papineau has pointed out (personal communication), it is even possible to
understand realization as the converse of supervenience: φ realizes ψ if and only if ψ supervenes on
φ . Under this analysis, it is hardly surprising if both relations turn out to be equally problematic
for ideal interlevel interventions. But even under the more complex definitions of realization
put forward in recent debates, which often make no overt reference to supervenience, it is still
plausibly the case that changes in ψ require changes in φ . Note that I am here intentionally
working with a very abstract characterization of the realization relation. The reason is that there is
currently considerable dispute as to the ‘appropriate’ type of realization relation in the mechanistic
context (Polger 2010). In this dispute, Craver himself seems to side with those advocating the
‘dimensioned’ concept against the ‘flat’ one (Craver 2007, p. 212). But it is also questionable
whether there is a genuine disagreement between these two notions to begin with (Endicott 2011).
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of the mechanism and its components.7
What should we then think about mutual manipulability? For as we recall, es-
tablishing the mutual manipulability relation between S’s ψ-ing and some particular
X’s φ -ing very much requires top-down interventions. One possibility would be to
bite the bullet and say that there is just less mutual manipulability, and consequently
constitutive relevance, than what was initially expected. But this is very implausible
indeed, given that almost nothing would then count as constitutively relevant. We
could also give up on Craver’s criterion, in which case it would remain puzzling as to
why something like the mutual manipulability criterion seems to be implicit in the
practice of science. Moreover, simple example cases such as the braking mechanism
in a bicycle suggest that the appropriate combination of top-down and bottom-up
interventions delivers the prima facie correct results. Finally, a third option is to
leave the mutual manipulability criterion as it is and instead develop the notion of
ideal interventions. As it happens, interventionists working on the causal exclusion
problem have recently done just that.8
To remind ourselves of the causal exclusion problem, let us look at the classic
diagram in Figure 2, which represents a system in which some relations are causal
and some relations are non-causal. The usual interpretation is that P1 and P2
are some physical properties and that the arrow between them represents a causal
relation. M1 and M2 are assumed to be mental properties and the dotted lines
between the Ps and the Ms are thought to represent supervenience or realization
relations, or perhaps some other non-causal relations. The standard problem is,
of course, whether it is legitimate to draw an arrow from the mental M1 to the
physical P2. Since the relationship between the mental and the physical is not of
special concern here, we need not assume anything substantive about the nature of
the Ps and the Ms. Thus, I am again going to talk as if all the relations in models
like the one in Figure 2, including the non-causal ones, hold between variables.
Additionally, to keep things simple, I will assume that the non-causal relation in
7The argument in the previous section also shows why the worries raised by Leuridan (2012,
p. 407-409) about interlevel interventions satisfying conditions (I1)–(I4) are premature. There are
no such interlevel interventions because conditions (I1) or (I2) will be violated as the result of the
close-knitted metaphysical relationship between the mechanism as a whole and its components-
taken-together, such as supervenience or realization. Leuridan’s argument is that if we assume that
Craver’s interlevel interventions satisfy conditions (I1)–(I4), then it very much looks as if those
interventions pick out causal relevance relations. My answer here is that we should not make such
an unrealistic assumption in the first place. In any case, Leuridan then goes on to ask whether
Craver could use a parthood criterion to argue that mechanistic interlevel interventions are not
causal. In order to do that, he thinks, Craver would need to be able to assume that (i) ‘if X is
part of S, then an intervention I on X directly changes S’ whilst denying that (ii) ‘if X is part of
S, then an intervention I on X’s φ -ing directly changes S’s ψ-ing’. The problem is, according to
Leuridan, that it is hard to make the former assumption without making the latter. As it happens,
in Section 6.1 I will demonstrate why what Leuridan claims is difficult for Craver is not difficult at
all: the key move is to understand mutual manipulability as involving three variables. For further
discussion of Leuridan’s argument, see Footnotes 16 and 18.
8Note that the problem does not depend on whether the mutual manipulability criterion is
interpreted ‘metaphysically’ or ‘epistemologically’ (cf. Schindler 2013). Either way, the interlevel
interventions turn out non-ideal. Moreover, the following question would remain even under the
weaker epistemological reading: what is the metaphysical structure that grounds top-down and
bottom-up experiments?
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question is supervenience.9
Now, the problem here, too, is that a change M1 will be accompanied by a
change in P1, given the nature of supervenience. By now we know very well why
this suggests that there are no ideal interventions on M1 with respect to P2: the
intervention on M1 automatically changes variable P1, which again is causally related
with variable P2. This appears to conflict with condition (I2) on ideal interventions.
One conclusion would be that we have just formulated an interventionist version
of Kim’s (cf. 2000) ‘causal exclusion argument’. Baumgartner, for example, has
promoted this view (cf. 2010). The reasoning is that, since there are no ideal
interventions on M1 with respect to P2, there cannot possibly be a causal relation
between M1 and P2, given that the presence of causality in the interventionist
framework requires the possibility of such an intervention. This follows from the
way in which interventionists typically define their causal notions. Woodward, for
example, gives the following necessary and sufficient condition for variable X’s being
a type-level direct cause of variable Y (relativizing causal claims to some set of
variables V):
There [must] be a possible intervention on X that will change Y or the
probability distribution of Y when one holds fixed at some value all other
variables Zi in V (Woodward 2005, p. 59).
His necessary and sufficient condition for X’s being a type-level contributory cause
of Y with respect to V is that:
There be a directed path from X to Y such that each link in this path
is a direct causal relationship [...and] there be some intervention on X
that will change Y when all other variables in V that are not on this
path are fixed at some value (Woodward 2005, p. 59).
The notion of intervention in these definitions is assumed to be precisely the kind
of ideal intervention satisfying conditions (I1)–(I4). The non-existence of such an
intervention on M1 with respect to P2 is then taken, by Baumgartner, to suggest
that M1 cannot be causally related with P2 under interventionism.10
Many philosophers (Sober and Shapiro 2007, Woodward 2014, Shapiro 2012)
disagree with the above argument. An obvious objection is that the notion of an
ideal intervention of the type satisfying conditions (I1)–(I4) was developed in the
9One further assumption here and elsewhere in this paper is that a supervenient variable cannot
be causally related with its supervenience base. This is trivially the case if the relationship between
the two violates condition (I1) for ideal interventions, as I think it does. But again the same
conclusion can be achieved by observing that the two variables violate the independent fixability
condition (see footnotes 5 and 10).
10The debate gets more complex than this. For instance, it is usually framed in terms of the
‘independent fixability’ condition that many (cf. Baumgartner 2010, Halpern and Hitchcock 2011,
Woodward 2014) take to be an important interventionist assumption and that is also discussed
in footnotes 5 and 9. A roughly similar assumption can be found in the work of Craver (2007,
p. 156-157), although it is not clear whether Craver’s version of the condition is equivalent to
those put forward by others (cf. Woodward 2014, p. 14). (I thank anonymous referee for pointing
out the apparent lack of equivalence.) For the purposes of this paper, however, we can happily
continue to frame the debate in terms of the conditions for ideal interventions.
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Figure 2: Classic diagram representing the problem of high-level causation.
context of causal models. The conditions seek to capture a view of interventions
that can be reasonably thought to underlie causal inference in such models, and this
is one of the reasons why we might want to understand causal notions in terms of
ideal interventions in the first place. Note that the motivation for criteria (I1)–(I4)
did not arise from how causal inference works in cases such as the one in Figure
2, in which we are dealing with causal as well as non-causal relations. So there
is no immediate reason to assume that criteria (I1)–(I4) must apply, unchanged,
in the context of models that contain non-causal relations. Another problem with
Baumgartner’s argument is that the counterfactual that we are supposed to evaluate
when assessing the causal status of M1 with respect to P2 has a metaphysically
impossible antecedent: ‘If an ideal intervention (on M1 w.r.t. P2) were to change
the value of M1, the value of P2 would change.’ The antecedent is metaphysically
impossible because the supervenience relations in the model ensure that there are
no interventions on M1 with respect to P2 that would satisfy conditions (I1)–(I4).
This is true, mutatis mutandis, of all of the relations between variables to which the
interventionist variant of the exclusion argument is supposed to apply. But under
standard semantics (cf. Lewis 1973), this shows at best that the counterfactual in
question is vacuous (or vacuously true)–not that M1 cannot possibly cause P2.11
The alternative view that interventionists of the non-exclusionist persuasion
have put forward (cf. Sober and Shapiro 2007, Woodward 2014) is that if our
models contain non-causal relations in addition to causal ones, we can employ
the interventionist techniques of assessing causality by letting variables related via
logical or ‘metaphysical’ relations vary in a way that ‘respects’ those relations. What
I mean by a metaphysical relation in this section includes supervenience, realization
and other relevantly similar relations. So, for example, when we intervene on M1,
we let P1 change at the same time, and exclude P1 from those variables that our
intervention on M1 with respect to P2 must leave intact. Under this extension of
11This is just how Lewis treats counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. The motivation
that Lewis gives for this involve the intuition, which some might have, that if something impossible
were to be true, then anything could be true (Lewis 1973, p. 24). Another thing worth noting is
that Woodward himself requires that, in order for X to cause Y, there must be an ideal intervention
on X with respect to Y (Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, Woodward 2005). But it is not clear
whether this commitment is essential for the interventionist programme.
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the interventionist approach, we do have an ideal intervention on M1 with respect
to P2. Whether M1 is causally related with P2 then depends on what would happen
to the value P2 if the value M1 would be changed by means of that ideal (under the
extended approach) intervention. Suppose that the relationship between M1 and P2
does indeed satisfy, say, Woodward’s definition of M1’s being causally related with
P2. Then that relation is what some people will call ‘downward causation’. Note
the compatibility of this type of downward causation with there being supervenience
relations in the model (represented by the dotted arrows in Figure 2). Even though
M1 supervenes on P1, that does not in any way prevent M1’s being causally related
with P2 according to extended interventionism. The above approach can be stated
in the form of the following two principles:
(EI1) If variable X and variable SB(X) are related via supervenience or
some other metaphysical or logical relation, an intervention on X may
at the same time be an intervention on SB(X); and
(EI2) when assessing whether X is a direct or contributory cause of
some variable Y, SB(X) should not be regarded as belonging to the set
of variables that must be left intact or controlled for in the intervention
on X.
(EI1) and (EI2) are meant to describe how we can go on conducting ideal inter-
ventions in models that contain non-causal relations in a way that ‘respects’ those
relations. Note that when I say, in condition (EI1), that the intervention is an
intervention on X and SB(X) at the same time, this should be read literally: it is
the same one intervention that changes both variables simultaneously, as requested
by the supervenience relation and other relevantly similar relations (see Woodward
2014, p. 25-30 for further rationale and discussion). It is easy to see how simple
the approach is: we ignore the variables that are related via metaphysical or log-
ical relations with the variable on which we intervene, and allow them to vary in
whichever way is necessary as a result of the nature of the relevant relation.12
What is the motivation for this extension of interventionism? Here both Wood-
ward (2014) and Shapiro and Sober (2007) appeal to scientific practice. According
to them, when researchers evaluate the causal contribution of some variable X, they
do not regard the supervenience base SB(X) of that variable as something that
needs to be left intact or ‘controlled for’ in the intervention on X. Controlling for, in
this context, can be understood as holding the values of some subset of variables in
one’s model ‘fixed’ while the value of X is being varied (see Woodward’s conditions
for direct and contributory causes above). In assessing whether X causes Y, scien-
tists are clearly worried about some third variable Z genuinely independent of X that
is also causally related with Y. These types of variables are immediately regarded
as potential confounders. But scientists do not seem similarly worried about the
12One might worry that the proposed extension is ad hoc, and Woodward himself (2014, p. 30)
concedes that his conditions for extended interventions are ‘cumbersome’. But I believe the only
reason (EI1) and (EI2) sound ad hoc is that they weren’t included in the original set of complex
conditions used to formulate interventionism in the first place. The crucial test here is whether
they capture the scientific practice, which I’ve argued they do. I thank an anonymous reviewer for
drawing my attention to this worry.
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supervenience base SB(X) of X, even if SB(X) is causally related with Y, just as P1
is causally related with P2 in Figure 2.
To drive the point home, Woodward (2014) devises a thought experiment about
a medical researcher who argues that ingesting a certain drug D cannot cause re-
covery R because it is not possible to intervene on D without at the same time
changing the physical state of affairs SB(D) on which D supervenes. All interven-
tions on whether a subject ingests D are bound to change whether the subject has
a substance with the microproperties of D present in her system. And that state
of affairs SB(D) is for the researcher a confounding variable with respect to R. The
punchline of this story is that the scientific community would regard these claims
as silly and the researcher a crank. The reason apparently is that scientists do not
regard subvenient variables as causal competitors of those variables that supervene
on them in anything like the manner that they regard genuinely distinct variables
as potential causal competitors.13 This may be because variables bearing logical or
metaphysical relations with each other are tied together more closely than variables
bearing causal relations only. A typical requirement imposed on causal relata is that
they should be wholly distinct, and it is clear that this is not the case with variables
related via the kinds of non-causal relation that I have discussed in this section.
In the remaining part of this paper, I want to see how we can go about under-
standing mechanistic models if we adopt the ‘extended interventionism’ of Wood-
ward (2014) and Shapiro and Sober (2007). More specifically, I want to see what
happens if we accept principles (EI1) and (EI2). In the next section, my argument
will be that doing so leads us to a radical reinterpretation of the metaphysics of
mutual manipulability.
6 Towards Causal Inbetweenness
So far in this paper I have sought to establish three points. First, I showed that
the notion of mutual manipulability is based on the assumption that we are able
to perform ideal interventions in models that contain causal as well as non-causal
relations. Second, I pointed out that a typical way of understanding the non-causal
dimension in mechanistic models is to treat it as a species of supervenience or
realization. I argued that the presence of these types of relation foils the ideality
of interventions on the behaviour of a mechanism as a whole with respect to the
behaviours of its components under standard conditions. But then, third, I observed
that the standard conditions for ideal interventions should in fact be extended if our
models contain non-causal relations. In this last section of the paper my aim will
be very simple: I will adopt the extended notion of ideal interventions and apply it
in the context of mutual manipulability. The resulting picture I will call the idea of
13Baumgartner (2013) argues that scientists might want to regard D and SB(D) as competitors
if they suspect that D does not reduce to SB(D). If there would be some sort of primitive and
inexplicable supervenience relation between the two, then we might actually see scientists requiring
interventions on D with respect to R that would at the same time leave SB(D) unchanged. Perhaps
this is so. But the reason is the suspect nature of the supervenience relation between D and SB(D)
and not because this is the correct way to do causal modeling.
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‘causal inbetweenness’.14
6.1 Mutual Manipulability as a Three Variable Affair
My argument begins from a further explication of S’s ψ-ing. Thus far, I haven’t
discussed in any detail what it means specifically to intervene on ψ. As I hinted
earlier, the phenomenon exhibited by a mechanism as whole is usually thought to be
some regularity, identified in terms of the conditions under which it occurs, doesn’t
occur, or is altered. According to Craver, that regularity can be thought of as holding
between some complex sets of inputs and outputs (Craver 2007, p. 145), and it
is commonplace to think of it as causal (cf. Menzies 2012, Soom 2012, Glennan
1996). Adopting the interventionist convention, such causal regularities are to be
understood as holding between the values of variables. Ignoring the complexity of
real-life cases, it is possible to represent the phenomenon exhibited by a mechanism
as a causal relation holding between two variables, ψin and ψout , corresponding
to the input and output conditions characteristic of the relevant regularity. These
variables could have as many values as we like, but for my purposes it suffices to
imagine them as having just two values corresponding to the presence or absence
of the appropriate conditions; let these values be ‘1’ for the presence and ‘0’ for the
absence.
Adopting the above simplified interpretation of the behaviour exhibited by a
mechanism as a whole, how should we understand interventions on such behaviour?
Here is the key: ‘One intervenes on S’s ψ-ing by intervening to provide the con-
ditions under which S regularly ψs’ (Craver 2007, p. 146). According to the the
interpretation sketched here, this amounts to changing the value of ψin to 1, as
a result of which ψout should take the value 1. In other words, we intervene in
order to make the input conditions occur, as a result of which the output conditions
typically occur. Of course, we might also intervene to make the input conditions
disappear, by setting ψin = 0, in which case we would expect ψout to take value 0,
too. And so on. If our variables would have multiple values–as they would in real-
life applications–we could establish all sorts of pattern between ψin and ψout . We
could investigate the behaviour of the mechanism under ‘modulating’ conditions,
by making minute changes in the values of the input variables and observing the
resulting changes (if any) in the output variables.
But note the implications of this very simple move. If S’s ψ-ing is understood
as a causal regularity holding between the values on ψin and ψout , then it appears
that assessments of mutual manipulability are best understood as involving three
variables. We have the higher-level input and output variables ψin and ψout , which
are together individuative of S’s ψ-ing, and then we have some lower-level variable
φi which engages in a manipulability relation with both of the higher-level variables.
Since interventions on the behaviour of a mechanism as a whole are here understood
as targeting the value of the input variable ψin, there now surfaces a natural way to
interpret the top-down experiments relevant for mutual manipulability: one wiggles
14I thank Carl Craver for suggesting this name for my approach, as well as for the many valuable
comments he provided regarding the ideas put forward in this section.
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the value of the input variable ψin and observes whether there occur any changes
in the value of the lower-level variable φi. What about the bottom-up experiments
also required for mutual manipulability? I contend that in such experiments one
typically wiggles the value of the lower-level variable φi and observes whether there
occur any changes in the output variable ψout .15 Note, finally, that the top-down
and bottom-up experiments as understood here needn’t be two-variable affairs. For
example, one can top-down intervene on ψin with respect to some φi while also
detecting changes in ψout . Or, alternatively, one can bottom-up intervene on some
φi with respect to ψout while at the same time manipulating the value of ψin: for
example, sometimes a change in φi will result in a change ψout only if the input
condition is also present. Craver (2007, personal communication) suggests that
this is what often happens in neuroscientific experiments. Figure 3 captures this
interpretation of mutual manipulability in terms of the hypothetical mechanistic
model discussed in Section 4 (and depicted in Figure 1).16
Recall the bicycle braking mechanism discussed earlier. Let the input variable
ψin correspond to whether force is applied on the lever and the output variable ψout
to whether the pads in the brake caliper press against the rim surface. Suppose the
lower level variable φi of interest corresponds to whether the cable connecting the
lever to the caliper moves relative to its housing. According to the interpretation
proposed here, the mechanistic investigation works as follows. In a top-down inter-
vention, one applies force on the lever (ψin) and observes changes in the position of
the cable (φi). In a bottom-up intervention, one changes the position of the cable
(φi) and observes changes in the brake caliper (ψout). If necessary, the investiga-
tor can switch to three-variable analysis by varying the position of the cable and
observing changes in the caliper while at the same time applying force on the lever.
With this interpretation of top-down and bottom-up interventions at hand, we
can now see how the extended notion of ideal interventions works with mechanisms.
In order to do so, let us go back to the model depicted in Figures 1 and 3. Let us
suppose that S’s ψ-ing supervenes on X1,...,n’s φ1,...n-ing and we want to investigate
whether X4’s φ4-ing (variable ‘φ4’ for short) is constitutively relevant for S’s ψ-ing.
This requires us to perform an ideal intervention on ψin (w.r.t. φ4) and see whether
there occurs a change in φ4. If ψin and φ4 covary, it would under the ‘narrow’
15I am not excluding the possibility that a researcher might sometimes wiggle the value of some
φi and detect changes in the value of the input variable ψin. This type of case might occur, for
example, if the φi in question is among the variables on which ψin supervenes. However, even in
this case it is plausible that the researcher would also require changes in ψout under the intervention
on φi.
16This three-variable nature of mutual manipulability is missed by Leuridan (2012), whose ar-
gument was discussed earlier in Footnote 7. As we recall, his claim was that, in order to argue
that mechanistic interlevel relations are not causal, Craver would have to maintain that (i) an in-
tervention on part X of S directly changes S while simultaneously denying that (ii) an intervention
on X’s φ -ing directly changes S’s ψ-ing–something Leuridan thought Craver would have a hard
time doing. However, the unpacking of S’s ψ-ing as involving two variables and the consequent
interpretation of mutual manipulability as a three-variable affair shows why one could easily hold
(i) while denying (ii). The issue is a red herring. Why mechanistic interlevel relations come out
as causal isn’t to do with the difficulty of holding the above combination of beliefs; it’s to do with
what is a plausible account of interlevel interventions. My argument is that it is the extended one.
See also Footnote 18.
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Figure 3: Top-down and bottom-up experiments further unpacked. Here, a hypo-
thetical investigator wants to establish whether X4’s φ4-ing (or ‘φ4’ for short) stands
in the mutual manipulability relation with S’s ψ-ing. The top-down intervention
required for mutual manipulability changes the value of ψin and detects changes in
the value of φ4; the bottom-up intervention similarly required changes the value of
φ4 and detects changes in the value of ψout . The intralevel arrows, which are greyed
out for expository purposes, represent causal relations. Assuming that causes tem-
porally precede their effects, it follows that the arrow of time in the model points
from left to right.
interpretation of ideal interventions suggest that the intervention on ψin is not ideal
with respect to φ4. The reason is that the likely explanation for the covariance would
be: either φ4 is among the variables in the supervenience base of ψin and change
directly in the intervention; or then the variables in the supervenience base of ψin
that change directly in the intervention include some variable(s) causally related
with φ4.
With extended interventionism, the situation is completely different. True, if
the intervention on ψin directly changes φ4 because φ4 is in the supervenience base
of ψin, then it isn’t ideal with respect to φ4. This violates condition (I1) just as
before, and the extended approach doesn’t make any amendments with regard to
this type of case. But if the intervention on ψin directly changes some variables in
the supervenience base of ψin that are causally related with φ4, then that does not
rule out the ideality of that intervention under the extended approach. For according
to conditions (EI1) and (EI2), we let such variables vary in a way that respects the
supervenience relation in question and do not demand that our intervention on ψin
must leave them intact. So suppose that, say, X1’s φ1-ing (variable ‘φ1’ for short)
in our model is among the variables in the supervenience base of ψin and as a
result changes directly in an intervention on ψin. Then, even though φ1 is causally
related with φ4 in the model, the intervention on ψin can be ideal with respect to φ4.
Whether it is ideal depends on whether the other conditions of ideality are satisfied.
But notice this: if the intervention on ψin satisfies all of the other conditions
of ideality with respect to φ4, and if the change introduced in the value of ψin
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via such an intervention results in a change in the value of φ4, then the relation-
ship between ψin and φ4 counts as causal. This is an instance of what some call
downward causality, and it is a straightforward consequence of the fact that the
relevant intervention now satisfies the conditions of ideality. Similarly, although less
controversially, if an intervention on the value of φ4 changes the value of ψout and
satisfies the conditions of ideality, then that relation too counts as causal. This,
then, is an instance of upward causality. Thus, adopting extended interventionism
renders ideal interventions in mechanistic models viable, but in doing so it treats an
important subset of the interlevel manipulability relations as causal.
Craver holds that the manipulability relation between the behaviour of a mech-
anism as a whole and the behaviours of its components cannot count as causal
because it is synchronic, symmetric and involves variables that are not wholly dis-
tinct (Craver and Bechtel 2007, Craver 2007). But if this is the case, then we are
going to end up with more trouble for ideal interventions. The problem is that we
still want the behaviour of the mechanism to supervene on the behaviours of its
components. But if one treats the behaviour of a mechanism as a single variable
supervening on everything that goes on at the level of its components, then it ap-
pears as if all interventions on the mechanism as a whole change the behaviours
of its components directly (if at all) and vice versa. This, of course, is against
the conditions of ideality.17 The picture that I have argued for doesn’t have this
problem because the overall behaviour is unpacked as involving two variables. This
is what makes it possible for me to have asynchronic, asymmetric manipulability
relations between distinct variables. In so far as ideal interventions are to play a
role in assessing constitutive relevance, I believe it is essential to see mutual manip-
ulability as a three variable affair involving interventionist interlevel causation. In
the following final section of this paper, I will briefly sketch how my account works
with a neuroscientific example.18
6.2 Causal Inbetweenness at Work: Explaining Neuronal Com-
munication
To illustrate the account sketched above, I want to focus on the phenomenon of
neuronal communication, which provides a paradigmatic example of mechanistic
explanation. Suppose we want to explain a neuron’s ability to transmit the signals
that it receives from other neurons. The input here is the reception of a signal at
17Or violates other important interventionist assumptions. See footnotes 5, 9 and 10.
18An anonymous reviewer asks what the relationship between constitution and causality is in
the account that I’m giving. Elsewhere (2014) I have developed an approach to constitution
under which parts must be causally in between the inputs and outputs defining the phenomenon
for which the whole of which they are parts is responsible. My view is that this is a natural
step to take if one is already willing to decide issues of constitutive relevance in terms of mutual
manipulability. An obvious implication of this is that I do not accept the view that constitutive
relations cannot be causal. On the contrary, I have outlined a perfectly good way in which there is
a causal relationship between a mechanism’s behaviour as a whole and the individual behaviours
of its components, even though the latter are constituents in the former. As the consequence of
this, putative counterexamples to views that Craver may hold, such as the case of endosymbiosis
discussed by Leuridan (2012, p. 412), are not counterexamples at all from my point of view.
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the dendrites and the output is the release of a signal at the axon terminals. A
much simplified lower-level story could go something like this. The signals come in
the form of neurotransmitters such as glutamate that bind in receptors typically in
the dendrites of the neuron. This binding causes the opening of various voltage-
dependent gates that are embedded in the neuron’s membrane. When the neuron is
in its resting state it functions as a battery: there is a higher potassium concentration
inside the cell and a higher sodium concentration outside. Specific transmembrane
sodium-potassium pumps work for this purpose. The differing sodium and potassium
concentrations inside and outside of the cell keep the neuron slightly negatively
charged. When the neurotransmitters bind in the receptors in the dendrites, the
voltage-dependent gates open in a way that enables sodium influx and potassium
efflux. This raises the neuron’s potential.
If the neuron receives enough signals so that their combined effect raises its
potential above a certain threshold level, this generates a positive feedback loop
where more and more voltage-dependent gates open at an increasing rate, typically
in the neuron’s axon hillock area. This results in a rapid increase followed by a swift
decrease in the neuron’s potential, i.e. generates an action potential. The shape of
the potential is the result of the differing opening and closing times of potassium and
sodium channels. The action potential then has the ability to propagate through
the neuron’s axon owing to the axon’s physical structure, which may include a
surrounding wrap of myelin that has tiny gaps where the action potential reoccurs.
When the action potential finally arrives at the axon terminals, it causes calcium
channels in the membrane to open, which triggers a chain of chemical events in
which vesicles containing neurotransmitters fuse in the membrane, releasing the
neurotransmitters in the process. This completes the transmission of the signal in
this caricaturized example of a mechanistic explanation.
Suppose we are interested in whether, say, the opening and closing of a voltage-
dependent gate at some region in the neuron’s axon is a part of the mechanism
for signal transmission. That is, we want to find out whether the behaviour of
a lower-level component is constitutively relevant with respect to a phenomenon
exhibited by the mechanism at a higher level. In order to conduct the required top-
down intervention, we need to vary between the condition in which the input for
the neuron (the reception of a signal) is present and the one in which it isn’t. The
presence or absence of this input corresponds to the value of ψin. We must then see
whether the status of the voltage-dependent gate covaries with those conditions.
The status of the gate corresponds to the value of φi. As the above story suggests,
the presence or absence of the input condition supervenes on the presence or absence
of neurotransmitters in a thousand receptors in the dendrites of the neuron. That
is why, when we wiggle the value of the variable corresponding to the presence
or absence of the input condition (ψin), we at the same time wiggle the values
of the numerous variables corresponding to the statuses of these receptors. From
these lower-level variables starts an ordinary intralevel causal chain that may or may
not lead to the voltage-sensitive gate under investigation. If the value of the gate
variable (φi) covaries with the presence or absence of the signal, it is indeed likely
that there is such a causal chain from the receptors to the voltage-dependent gate.
This in itself doesn’t preclude the ideality of the intervention on the neuron as a
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whole with respect to that voltage-dependent gate. If the intervention otherwise
satisfies the conditions of ideality (as it should), the interlevel relation between the
input variable (ψin) and the gate variable (φi) counts as causal under extended
interventionism.
The relevant bottom-up intervention proceeds from the voltage-sensitive gate to
the output condition, which is the release of a signal by the neuron. The presence
or absence of this condition corresponds to the value of ψout . Again we know from
the above story that the value of this higher-level output variable supervenes on the
values of lower-level variables that correspond, among other things, to the statuses
of the vesicles containing the neurotransmitters in the axon terminal membranes. If
there is a covariance between whether the voltage-dependent gate is open (the value
of φi) and whether the output condition is present (the value of ψout), then it is likely
that there is an ordinary intralevel causal chain from the voltage-sensitive gate to the
variables corresponding to the statuses of the vesicles containing neurotransmitters.
Note that the covariance between the gate variable and the output variable need only
be ‘visible’ when the values of a number of other variables, possibly including the
input variable, are held fixed.19 Again, if the intervention on the value of the gate
variable changes the value of the output variable and otherwise satisfies the extended
conditions of ideality (as it should), then this interlevel relation too counts as causal.
Imagine Figure 3 depicts the mechanistic model for neural communication. Then
variable ψin in the model corresponds to the arrival of a signal, ψout to the release
of a signal and φ4 to the status of the voltage-sensitive gate. The gate variable is
causally in between the input and output variables.
7 Conclusion
The problem of constitutive relevance is that of picking out exactly those compo-
nents that should be included in a mechanistic explanation for a phenomenon and
of specifying the nature of the relation that holds between those components and
that explanandum. Craver’s mutual manipulability criterion is a major step forward
in this regard because it addresses these issues by building upon the scientific prac-
tice and the well worked out interventionist account of causation. In this paper I
have pointed out the tensions that remain in the mutual manipulability criterion as
the result of the fact that mechanistic models contain causal as well as non-causal
relations. Further, I have demonstrated how those tensions can be resolved with
the help of extended interventionism when mutual manipulability is understood as
a three variable affair. The resulting picture differs from Craver’s in that many of
the relevant manipulability relations in top-down and bottom-up interventions come
19In practical terms, investigating the causal contribution of some single voltage-dependent
gate is clearly unrealistic. A real-life researcher would be likely to intervene on a number of
voltage-dependent gates in a given region and see whether that results in changes in the output
(real-life interventions are most of the time ham-fisted). But recall the counterfactual element in
interventionism. The appropriate question here is: would the neuron release a signal if an ideal
intervention were to change the status of the voltage-dependent gate under investigation, whilst
the values of various off-path variables, including those corresponding to the statuses of the other
voltage-dependent gates in the relevant region, would be held fixed.
19
out as causal. I regard this as welcome because it suggests that the question con-
cerning the nature of these relations reduces to the question concerning the nature
of causation. If this is right, there is no special problem about the metaphysics of
mutual manipulability.
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